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A bi-level model for optimal capacity investment and subsidy design
under risk aversion and uncertainty
Maria Tsiodraa and Michail Chronopoulosa,b
aCity, University of London, London, UK; bNorwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
ABSTRACT
Meeting ambitious sustainability targets motivated by climate change concerns requires the
structural transformation of many industries and the careful alignment of firm- and
Government-level policymaking. While private firms rely on Government support to achieve
timely the necessary green investment intensity, Governments rely on private firms to tackle
financial constraints and technology transfer. This interaction is analysed in the real options
literature only under risk neutrality, and, consequently, the implications of risk aversion due
to the idiosyncratic risk that green technologies entail are overlooked. To analyse how this
interaction impacts a firm’s investment policy and a Government’s subsidy design under
uncertainty and risk aversion, we develop a real options framework, whereby: (i) we solve
the firm’s investment problem assuming an exogenous subsidy; (ii) conditional on the firm’s
optimal investment policy, we address the Government’s optimisation objective and derive
the optimal subsidy level; (iii) we insert the optimal subsidy level in (i) to derive the firm’s
endogenous investment policy. Contrary to existing literature, results indicate that greater
risk aversion lowers the amount of installed capacity yet postpones investment. Also,
although greater uncertainty raises the optimal subsidy under risk neutrality, the impact of
uncertainty is reversed under high levels of risk aversion.
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The need for sustainable green growth has moti-
vated the implementation of a wide range of envir-
onmental regulations to promote the structural
transformation for many industries. However, this
transformation is a capital intensive process that
requires the collaboration between Governments
and private firms in order to overcome budgetary
and technology constraints. Indeed, Governments
rely on private firms in order to tackle financial
constraints and access technological innovations.
Similarly, private firms rely on Government support,
since they are expected to engage at unprecedented
levels in renewable energy (RE) investment as well
as research and development (R&D). In this paper,
we develop an analytical framework in order to
explore this interaction and derive a solution that is
optimal from both a firm’s and Government’s per-
spective. This is a notoriously challenging task
because we must take into account various trade-
offs that impact not only a Government’s but also a
private firm’s optimisation objectives.
i. From the perspective of a private firm, capital
intensive projects are particularly risky, since
they require accurate investment timing and
capacity sizing decisions. However, a large cap-
acity raises the firm’s exposure to downside
risk, while a small capacity implies that reve-
nues could be forgone if market conditions
suddenly become favourable.
ii. The Government’s objective is twofold:
iii. First, the level of subsidy should stimulate
investment in a way that environmental targets
are met both in terms of timing and invest-
ment intensity. However, a high (low) subsidy
may result in early (later) investment, but in a
smaller (bigger) project.
iv. Second, if the subsidy takes the form of a cash
grant (Lukas & Thiergart, 2019), then, upon
the firm’s investment, the Government receives
a tax in the form of a concession fee from the
operating project’s cash flows, reflecting a fair
return for the Government investment. Hence,
the Government must balance the level of sup-
port so as to maximize its net tax income at
the time of investment.
If the interaction among the aforementioned
optimisation objectives is not properly understood,
then subsidies and incentives will not be properly
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set, resulting in a dynamic inefficiency with possible
cycles of under or over investment, and, in conse-
quence, increased regulatory risk when corrective
policy actions are required.
From the perspective of Government policymaking
and subsidy design, many countries have imple-
mented a wide range of support schemes, including
various forms of feed-in tariffs and tax incentives to
promote green capacity investment (European
Commission, 2005). The diversity of support schemes
has motivated academic research on which scheme is
more effective in fostering the diffusion of RE tech-
nologies. However, the comparison has focused
mainly on price support systems, subsidy schemes
and fiscal incentives (Boomsma et al., 2012;
Boomsma & Linnerud, 2015), thus ignoring the con-
tribution of schemes for overcoming budgetary con-
straints, such as the public-private partnerships
(PPPs)(Kr€uger, 2012; Power et al., 2016). The latter,
are legal partnerships between public and private
actors for joint equity investments in infrastructure
projects. One of the challenges associated with PPPs
is that of identifying ex-ante the level of Government
support that will facilitate the timely development
and adoption of technological innovations.
Further complicating the interaction between
firm- and Government-level policy-making is that
investment within the R&D-based sector of the
economy often entails idiosyncratic risk that cannot
be diversified. Therefore, decision-making at the
firm level should account for risk aversion. Indeed,
the underlying commodities of such projects are not
likely to be freely traded, which prevents the con-
struction of a replicating portfolio as the assumption
of hedging via spanning assets breaks down.
Therefore, in this paper, we develop a utility-based,
bi-level framework between a private firm and a
Government in order to analyse how the optimal
capacity investment and subsidy design are affected
by not only economic uncertainty but also attitudes
towards risk. Our analysis is based on real options
theory, as it accounts for decision making under
uncertainty, while reflecting the flexibility from
embedded managerial discretion. Within the context
of PPPs, real options models analysing the inter-
action between firm- and Government-level policy-
making have been developed under the assumption
of risk neutrality (Lukas & Thiergart, 2019).
Within this context, we assume that the subsidy
takes the form of a cash grant, which, alongside tax
credits and infrastructure assistance, is one of the
common types of Governmental support. For
example, in 2010 the EU granted roughly e10.9 bil-
lion to promote corporate R&D investments, while,
since 2004, the Texas Enterprise Fund has awarded
nearly $600 million to companies such as Apple
Inc., eBay, Lockheed Martin, Samsung and
T-Mobile (Lukas & Thiergart, 2019). In addition,
within the context of green investment, cash grants
and PPP agreements have been increasingly utilised
to support investment in RE infrastructure (Giles &
Clark, 2012; REN21, 2018), have been recognised
for their contribution in the diffusion of wind power
(Dinica, 2008; Martins et al., 2011) and have been
proposed as a valid alternative to traditional policies
for promoting climate change (Buso & Stenger,
2018; Nagy et al., 2019; Rossi et al., 2019).
Consequently, the contribution of our work is three-
fold: i. First, we develop a bi-level framework to
analyse how the objective of a Government and a
private firm can be coupled to meet ambitious sus-
tainability targets under uncertainty and risk aver-
sion; ii. Second, we derive the optimal investment
threshold and optimal capacity of a private firm, as
well as the Government’s optimal subsidy policy
(analytically where possible); and iii. Third, we pro-
vide policy and managerial insights based on analyt-
ical and numerical results.
We proceed by discussing some related work in
Section 2 and present the analytical framework in
Section 3. First, we introduce assumptions and nota-
tion in Section 3.1 and then we derive the optimal
investment policy of the private firm in Section 3.2
assuming that the subsidy is defined exogenously.
Subsequently, we derive the equilibrium character-
ised by the capacity investment decision of a private
firm and the Government’s optimal subsidy policy
in Section 3.3. Section 4 presents numerical exam-
ples as well as policy implications based on numer-
ical and analytical results, while Section 5 concludes
the paper offering directions for further research.
2. Related works
Following the seminal work of McDonald and Siegel
(1985) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the real
options literature has grown considerably to include
various models that analyse the implications of
uncertainty for capacity investment decisions within
a wide range of contexts. Early examples include
Pindyck (1988), who considers a firm that expands
its capital stock incrementally with operational flexi-
bility. Also, discrete capacity sizing is addressed in
Dixit (1993), who develops a model for choosing
among mutually exclusive projects under uncer-
tainty. An extension of this line of work that allows
for a continuously scalable capacity is presented in
Dangl (1999), who finds that demand uncertainty
raises the optimal capacity and makes waiting the
optimal strategy even when demand is high.
Extending the framework of Dixit (1993), Decamps
et al. (2006) identifies a second waiting region
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around the indifference point between the net pre-
sent values (NPVs) of two projects. Within this
region, a firm will select the smaller (larger) project
if the price drops (increases) sufficiently. Recent
extensions of this line of work include Hagspiel
et al. (2016a) and Wen et al. (2017b), who allow for
volume flexibility and other types of
demand functions.
Applications of real options models for capacity
investment under uncertainty to the energy sector
are presented in Fleten et al. (2007) and Bøckman
et al. (2008), while policy-oriented applications are
presented in Siddiqui and Fleten (2010), Boomsma
et al. (2012), Boomsma and Linnerud (2015),
Chronopoulos et al. (2016) and Wen et al. (2017a).
More recently, Bigerna et al. (2019) develop a real
options model for optimal capacity investment in
RE under market demand uncertainty within the
context of the Italian strategy for RE deployment
under the EU policy. Their results confirm that a
given environmental target cannot be reached by
simply scaling the amount of support, and show
that there exists an optimal subsidy level. The con-
tribution of this line of work is that it provides pol-
icy insights in terms of the likelihood of meeting
environmental targets set at a Government level by
exploring how capacity investment decisions of pri-
vate firms are affected by market and policy risk.
However, a limitation of the aforementioned lit-
erature is that the optimal investment policy and
subsidy design are typically determined ex-post and
not via the strategic interactions and the resulting
equilibrium between a firm’s and a Government’s
optimisation objective. Such strategic interactions
are considered in the real options literature within
the context of PPPs for investment in infrastructure
projects. For example, Pennings (2000) uses a real
options model to study how a Government can
manipulate a firm’s investment decision via combi-
nations of tax reduction and investment subsidy.
Results indicate that if tax collections and invest-
ment subsidy are combined in a way that they offset
each other, then the entry trigger is a decreasing
function of the tax rate. This implies that an invest-
ment subsidy is more efficient than a tax cut, which
is also confirmed in Yu et al. (2007). A similar
model is presented in Sarkar (2012), who examines
the net benefit to a Government from using tax cut
and/or investment subsidy as investment incentives.
Unlike Pennings (2000) and Yu et al. (2007), Sarkar
(2012) allows the Government’s and the firm’s dis-
count rate to differ. Under this assumption, results
indicate that it can be optimal to use a combination
of investment subsidy and tax cut in order to
encourage immediate investment.
The implications of PPP agreements for capacity
expansion in road infrastructure are analysed in
Kr€uger (2012), who develops a real options model
in order to evaluate the capacity expansion option,
assess the implications of ownership for exercising
the option and identify when it is socially optimal
to transfer ownership. Results indicate that the value
of the expansion option is considerable and may
entail a long waiting period prior to investment, yet
the timing of capacity expansion depends on the
level of traffic demand. Also, early expansion may
take place if congestion costs are sufficiently high,
but this decision depends also on the ownership of
the project. Specifically, if a private company owns
the right to expand, then this will result to a delay
in the decision to expand beyond the point of time
that is socially optimal.
In the same line of work, Power et al. (2016)
develop an analytical framework to value strategic
options in a specific type of PPP agreement, the
Comprehensive Development Agreements (CDAs),
emphasising on new transportation projects. The
strategic options considered are buyout and condi-
tional buyout options, revenue-sharing options for
the public agency and minimum revenue guarantee
options for the private sector. Results indicate that
baseline buyout, revenue-sharing and minimum rev-
enue guarantee options have significant value relative
to the value of the concession, because there is a
high probability that the options will be exercised.
However, the baseline conditional buyout option has
a small value, since it is likely to be out-of-the-money
throughout the life of the concession. Additionally,
the results suggest that strategic options are useful to
reduce revenue risk, yet scaling down their payoffs or
designing them as initially out-of-the-money may be
required to keep their cost low.
Apart from supporting infrastructure projects,
PPPs have become a valuable instrument for financ-
ing projects within the area of green energy and the
R&D-based sector of the economy (Alloisio &
Carraro, 2015; Carbonara & Pellegrino, 2020).
Indeed, RE technologies are highly capital intensive,
and, therefore, private sector capital, technology and
innovation are often procured via PPPs to supple-
ment limited public sector funding. Cedrick and
Long (2017) find that positive externalities and PPP
mechanisms present considerable incentives in the
increase of RE projects in some countries. Also, Buso
and Stenger (2018) compare policy responses to cli-
mate change and find that PPPs are more effective as
a climate change policy than public subsidies.
A bi-level real options model within the context
of PPPs is presented in Lukas and Thiergart (2019).
Specifically, they develop a game-theoretic real
options model between a risk-neutral firm and a
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Government in order to analyse the effect of uncer-
tainty and investment stimulus, in the form of a
cash grant, on optimal investment timing, financing
and investment scaling. As part of their analysis,
they derive closed-form expressions for the firm’s
optimal investment threshold and optimal capacity,
as well as for the optimal subsidy. However, this
work overlooks the implications of attitudes towards
risk that become particularly relevant with the
increasing amount of investment in emerging mar-
kets, since the assumption of hedging via spanning
assets breaks down, thus preventing risk-neu-
tral valuation.
Examples of early work in the area of investment
under risk aversion and uncertainty include
Henderson and Hobson (2002) and Henderson
(2007). The former introduce market incompleteness
via the inclusion of a risky asset on which no trad-
ing is allowed, while the latter assumes that the
uncertainty associated with the investment payoff
can be hedged only partly via a risky asset that is
correlated with the investment payoff. Results indi-
cate that higher risk aversion due to greater idiosyn-
cratic risk raises the incentive to reduce uncertainty
by investing at a lower threshold in order to lock-in
a value for the investment payoff. By contrast,
Hugonnier and Morellec (2013) show that risk aver-
sion erodes the value of a project and raises the
required investment threshold. However, allowing
for flexibility over project scale Chronopoulos et al.
(2013) show how greater risk aversion accelerates
investment by reducing the amount of installed cap-
acity. Extensions of this line of work that allow for
Markov regime-switching but ignore capacity sizing
include Matom€aki (2013) and Chronopoulos and
Lumbreras (2017). Despite their obvious policy-
making implications at a firm and Government
level, such insights are not considered in bi-level
models for investment under uncertainty that are
typically developed under the assumption of
risk neutrality.
In this paper, we extend the real options litera-
ture that analyses capacity investment decisions
within the context of PPP agreements to allow for
risk aversion with the objective to extend the appli-
cation potential of options theory within bi-level
optimisation frameworks for optimal subsidy design.
Thus, this paper builds upon and expands the litera-
ture that tackles the problem of ex-post optimal sub-
sidy design and investment under uncertainty and
risk-neutrality (Lukas & Thiergart, 2019; Bigerna
et al., 2019), so that risk preferences are taken into
account and the optimal subsidy is determined ex-
ante. We assume that a firm has a perpetual option
to invest in a project facing economic uncertainty,
and, therefore, its objective is to determine the
investment threshold and project scale that maxi-
mise the time-zero expected discounted utility of the
project’s cash flows. Economic uncertainty is
reflected in the output price that follows a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM), while the firm’s risk pref-
erences are modelled via hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) utility function. The Government
has a similar objective, since, upon the firm’s invest-
ment, it receives taxes from the operating project’s
cash flows. Hence, the objective of the bi-level
framework is to establish the appropriate subsidy
that the Government should offer ex-ante so that
the firm exercises its investment option timely.
Results indicate that the impact of risk aversion
within a strategic bi-level framework is different
than that presented in the existing literature.
Specifically, we find that although greater risk aver-
sion lowers the amount of installed capacity, it does
not accelerate investment, as demonstrated in
Chronopoulos et al. (2013). Instead, greater risk
aversion raises the incentive to postpone investment.
Intuitively, the decrease in project scale due to
greater risk aversion lowers the optimal subsidy,
thereby resulting in an increase of the required
investment threshold. Also, although greater uncer-
tainty raises the optimal subsidy under risk neutral-
ity, the impact of uncertainty is reversed under high
levels of risk aversion.
3. Model
3.1. Assumptions and notation
We consider a firm with a perpetual option to
invest in a project of infinite lifetime facing uncer-
tainty over future revenue steams. The firm has dis-
cretion over both the time of investment and the
size of the project. The output price process
Xt , t  0f g, where t denotes time, is exogenous and
follows a GBM that is described in (1), where l
denotes the annual growth rate, r denotes the
annual volatility and dZt denotes the increment of
the standard Brownian motion. Also, q denotes the
subjective discount and r is the risk-free rate.
dXt ¼ lXtdt þ rXtdZt, X0  X>0, (1)
The assumption that the output price follows a
GBM is often made in order to enable mathematical
tractability and to facilitate closed-form solutions,
however, it is also supported via empirical evidence.
Indeed, although Pindyck (1999) finds that energy
prices are mean reverting after analyzing 127 years
of commodity prices (including coal, natural gas,
and oil), he also finds that the rate of mean rever-
sion is low, so that using a GBM to model electricity
prices is unlikely to lead to large errors for the pur-
poses of investment analysis.1
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The firm’s preferences are described by a HARA
utility function (Sendstad & Chronopoulos, 2021),
as indicated in (2), where c>0 is the risk aversion
parameter. However, our framework can accommo-
date a wide range of utility functions, such as con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
(Conejo et al., 2016).





The investment cost IðÞ ($) is described in (3)
and implies that a higher investment level leads to a
higher cash flow with decreasing returns to scale.2
Evidence that support such a cost function within
the context of green energy are presented in
Bøckman et al. (2008), Dismukes and Upton (2015)
and Mignacca and Locatelli (2020). Also, in line
with Huisman and Kort (2015), we assume that the
firm always produces at full capacity, Q. This is
often referred to as the clearance assumption and
arises when it is costly to ramp up and down cap-
acity or when commitments to workers and suppli-
ers hinders temporary adjustments (Hagspiel et al.,
2016b). For ease of exposition we set IðQÞ  I:
IðQÞ ¼ Q
1 Q (3)
We assume that the firm receives Government sup-
port in the form of a cash grant, which is derived as
the outcome of a non-cooperative game between par-
ticipants i ¼ ff , gg, denoting the firm and the gov-
ernment. The optimal time of investment is denoted
by s, while the optimal investment threshold and the
optimal capacity are denoted by Xs and Q, respect-
ively, when the subsidy S is defined exogenously. If
the subsidy is defined endogenously, then the equilib-
rium investment threshold, the equilibrium capacity
and the equilibrium subsidy are denoted by X̂s, Q̂
and Ŝ, respectively. Also, FiðÞ is the maximised
expected value of the option to invest and UiðÞ is
the maximised expected utility of the active project.
3.2. Firm-level investment
We begin by analysing the investment decision at
the firm level. Notice that the utility function is not
separable, and, therefore, following the same
approach as Hugonnier and Morellec (2013) and
Conejo et al. (2016), the key insight is to decompose
the cash flows of the project into disjoint time inter-
vals, as illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, we assume
that the amount of capital required for investment
is exchanged at investment for the risky cash flows
of the project. Specifically, up to time s, the firm
earns a risk-free rate, r, by placing the capital
required for investment in an interest bearing
account. At time s, the firm swaps the risk-free cash
flow for the risky cash flow that the project gener-
ates, fixes the capacity of the project and incurs the
investment cost reduced by the subsidy.
The firm’s objective is to determine the investment
policy that maximises the time-zero expected dis-
counted utility of all the cash flows of the project. This
is described in (4), where s is the random first-passage
time of the state variable Xt through the investment
threshold from below, i.e., s ¼ inf t > 0 : Xt  Xsf g,
and S is the set of stopping times generated by the fil-
tration of the process Xt , t  0f g: Also, EX½ is the
expectation operator conditional on the initial value X






eqt U ð1 zÞXtQð Þ  U rðI  SÞð Þ½ dt
 
(4)
Next, we rewrite the right-hand side in (4) as in (5)
using the law of iterated expectations and the strong
Markov property of the GBM. The latter states that
the values of the price process after time s are inde-
pendent of the values before s and depend only on the








eqt½U ð1 zÞXtQð Þ
 U rðI  SÞð Þdt

(5)
Note that the inner conditional expectation’s inde-
pendence from Xs means that the two expectations




qs½ Uf Xsð Þ (6)
as the product of the stochastic discount factor (first
term) and the expected utility of the project’s cash
flows maximised with respect to capacity (second
term), i.e.:
Uf Xsð Þ ¼ EXs
ð1
0
eqt U ð1 zÞXtQð Þ  U rðI  SÞð Þdt½ 
 
(7)
Figure 1. Irreversible Investment.
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY 5
As indicated in (8), it is possible to derive the analyt-
ical expression for the expected utility of a perpetual




eqtU ð1 zÞXtQð Þdt
 
¼ AU ð1 zÞXQð Þ (8)
where A ¼ b1b2qðcb1Þðcb2Þ and bj denotes the positive
(b1) or negative (b2) root of the quadratic
1
2 r

































The first step in solving the firm’s capacity
investment problem is to assume that it does not
have the option to delay investment and must exer-
cise the investment opportunity immediately. If the
firm were to exercise a now-or-never investment
opportunity, then the current output price is known
and the firm would only need to determine the opti-
mal size of the project that corresponds to the cur-
rent level of the price process. Hence, the objective
of the firm when exercising a now-or-never invest-
ment opportunity is maxQ UfðXÞ, where:
UfðXÞ ¼ AU ð1 zÞXQð Þ 1qU rðI  SÞð Þ (11)
By applying the first-order necessary condition
(FONC) to the unconstrained optimisation problem
(11), we obtain the condition for the optimal cap-
acity, which is described in (12).









Next, we assume that Xt is too low to justify imme-
diate investment, and, therefore, the firm needs to wait
until Xt hits a sufficiently high threshold. Note that we
can write the stochastic discount factor as EX eqs½  ¼
ðXXsÞ
bj (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Therefore, FfðXÞ can






Uf Xsð Þ (13)
By applying the FONC to the unconstrained opti-
misation problem (13), we obtain the expression for
the optimal investment threshold that is indicated in
(14). Subsequently, by inserting (14) into (12) we
derive the analytical expression for optimal capacity,
which is indicated in (15).
Proposition 1. The optimal capacity Q(S) and the corre-
sponding optimal investment threshold XsðSÞ are given by
















provided that D ¼ c24b1Sðb1cÞ>0:
Under risk neutrality (c¼ 1), (14) and (15) sim-
plify to the analytical solution for the optimal
investment threshold and optimal capacity described
in Lukas and Thiergart (2019). Note that the
second-order sufficiency condition (SOSC) requires
the objective function to be concave at Xs, which is
shown in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The objective function FfðÞ is strictly
concave at Xs for all c<1:
The impact of greater risk aversion on the opti-
mal investment threshold is described in
Proposition 3. Intuitively, greater risk aversion low-
ers the investment propensity by decreasing the
expected utility of the project and raising the
required investment threshold.
Proposition 3. For a given subsidy level, greater risk
aversion lowers both the optimal capacity and the
required investment threshold.
In Proposition 4, we show that greater volatility
increases the optimal capacity. Intuitively, the firm
mitigates economic uncertainty by postponing the
investment decision in order to learn about future
market conditions, and, in case of favourable condi-
tions, the firm will invest later in a greater capacity.
Proposition 4. Greater economic uncertainty raises
the optimal capacity and increases the required
investment threshold.
Alongside the implications of r and c on the
optimal investment policy, of similar interest and
relevance is their impact on the likelihood of invest-
ment. Therefore, in order to analyse the uncer-
tainty-investment relationship, we also need to
account for the probability of investment within a
specific time horizon, denoted by T. This is
described in (16), where NðÞ denotes the cumula-
tive distribution function of the standard normal
distribution, and it depends on the level of the sub-
sidy through the critical threshold XsðSÞ:
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Note that the analysis of the firm’s investment
strategy so far assumes that the subsidy is deter-
mined exogenously. As such, it does not allow for
any interaction with decisions made at a
Government level; at least not in a way that would
impact the firm’s investment policy ex-ante. In
Section 3.3, we will extend this framework by analy-
sing how the firm’s and the Government’s optimisa-
tion objective can be brought together within a
single bi-level framework.
3.3. Government-level investment
Here, we analyse the Government’s subsidisation
policy. Note that upon the firm’s investment, the
Government receives taxes from the operating proj-
ect’s cash flows and incurs the cost reflected in the
provision of the cash grant. The Government’s net
income received upon investment is described in
(17). Following the same argument as Arrow and
Lind (1970), we assume that the Government is risk
neutral because it can hold a well-diversified port-
folio and distribute the risk over a large number of
shareholders.
UgðXÞ ¼ z XsðSÞQðSÞr  l S (17)
The trade-off implied by (17) gives rise to the ques-
tion of what is the appropriate level of the subsidy.
We assume that the Government will choose the
level of subsidy S so as to maximise its net tax
income at the time of investment. Following the
same approach as in the firm-level investment, the
value of the Government’s investment opportunity








r  l  S
 
(18)
The right-hand side of (18) represents the present
value of all future tax revenues the Government will
receive from the moment the firm invests. However,
this present value is received in exchange for paying
a subsidy S at the moment of investment. In order
to assess the profitability associated with S, this net
income has to be discounted because the firm con-
trols the timing and is likely to delay the investment
decision. Unlike Lukas and Thiergart (2019), here
the optimal subsidy is obtained numerically, since
the FONC for the unconstrained optimisation prob-
lem (18) is highly non-linear. Nevertheless, as indi-
cated in Section 4, the numerical results confirm
those of Lukas and Thiergart (2019), while also
extending them to allow for risk aversion.
Proposition 5. The optimal subsidy Ŝ is obtained




















Since the firm’s investment policy is subject to
the chosen subsidy, the solution for the equilibrium
investment threshold X̂s  XsðŜÞ and investment
level Q̂  QðŜÞ can be obtained by setting the solu-
tion of (19) into (14) and (15).
4 Numerical examples
To demonstrate the application potential of our
model and position it better within the energy sec-
tor, we consider the case of RE investment and util-
ise data from the Italian power sector (IEA, 2016) to
estimate the values of relevant parameter, such as l
and r. The estimated parameter values will serve as
the baseline values that will be extended to facilitate
sensitivity and robustness analysis within a range
that satisfies the condition indicated in Proposition
1, i.e., D ¼ c24b1Sðb1cÞ>0: Note that estimation
of the risk aversion parameter (c) requires an
empirical analysis of data on investors’ risk prefer-
ences, which is outside the scope of this paper.
The estimate for r is taken from Monte dei
Paschi di Siena (2011), a report on the status of the
RE sector in Italy. The reported discount rate relates
to a large plant (1MW) in 2010 and is estimated at
6%. Also, the estimate for l is derived assuming a
positive correlation between Xt and consumers’ will-
ingness to pay. The latter can be estimated using
data on the income growth and the expected reduc-
tion of the unit cost from 2010 to 2015. During this
period, the average growth rate, and, in turn, the
estimated sample mean of the log change of Xt is
1.83%. Finally, we assume that r can be estimated
as the historic annual standard deviation of price
changes (Fleten et al., 2007) and we use the esti-
mated value of the sample variance of the log
change of Xt, which is r2 ¼ 0:004726 or r ¼ 0:07:
The left panel in Figure 2 illustrates the firm’s
option and project value for different volatility lev-
els. Notice that greater economic uncertainty raises
the opportunity cost of investing, and, in turn, the
value of waiting, thereby increasing the required
investment threshold. Similarly, as the right panel
illustrates, both the optimal investment threshold
and the corresponding optimal capacity increase
with greater z. This happens because greater z low-
ers the expected utility of the project’s cash flows
and raises the firm’s incentive to compensate the
loss in value by raising the required invest-
ment threshold.
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The impact of economic uncertainty and risk aver-
sion on the optimal investment threshold and the opti-
mal capacity is illustrated in Figure 3. If the subsidy is
defined exogenously (top panels), then an increase in
risk aversion lowers both the optimal investment
threshold (left panel) and the optimal capacity (right
panel). This seemingly counter-intuitive result happens
because the investment decision is irreversible, and,
therefore, the firm is reluctant to postpone investment
with greater risk aversion if this entails the installation
of a bigger project. However, in direct contrast to the
existing literature, we find that if the subsidy is defined
endogenously, then the equilibrium investment thresh-
old increases with greater risk aversion, whereas the
equilibrium capacity decreases. This implies that
greater risk aversion not only delays investment but
also raises the incentive to install a smaller project.
Intuitively, this happens because of the interaction
between two opposing forces. On the one hand, greater
risk aversion increases the incentive to install a smaller
project, thus lowering the investment cost and the
required investment threshold (Chronopoulos et al.,
2013; Sendstad et al., 2021). On the other hand, a
decrease in the optimal capacity lowers the optimal
level of the subsidy, thereby raising the cost of invest-
ment and the required investment threshold.
Interestingly, although the balance between these two
effects is not readily obvious, Figure 3 indicates that
the latter effect dominates in equilibrium. In turn, this
demonstrates an implication of risk aversion that is
not pronounced when the interaction between firm-
and Government-level decision making is ignored and
the subsidy is defined exogenously (Boomsma &
Linnerud, 2015; Bigerna et al., 2019).
As illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4, the
increase in the optimal investment threshold with
greater risk aversion and uncertainty implies that
the probability of hitting that threshold within a
specific time interval decreases. However, a lower
tax rate raises the probability of investment by
increasing the expected utility of the project’s cash
flows, which lowers the required investment thresh-
old. Also, as the right panel indicates, economic
uncertainty impacts the level of subsidy that the
Government grants to the firm, but the effect is
ambiguous and depends crucially on the level of
risk aversion. Indeed, for low levels of risk aversion,
the right panel indicates that an increase in uncer-
tainty leads to an increase in the subsidy level,
whereas, for high levels of risk aversion, an increase
in economic uncertainty may lower the level
of subsidy.
Intuitively, subsidies affect investment timing,
and, in turn, the discounting of the Government’s
payoff. Provision of a high subsidy mitigates the
effect of discounting, yet has a negative influence on
the Government’s payoff. The strength of these
effects is heavily determined by the level of uncer-
tainty. Under risk neutrality, an increase in the level
of subsidy leads to benefits that outweigh the costs.
Indeed, an increase in the level of uncertainty raises
the investment intensity and the firm’s incentive to
delay investment. Anticipating this reaction, the
Government responds by increasing the subsidy in
order to limit the negative effect of discounting,
thereby maximizing its payoff. Interestingly, how-
ever, this result does not survive and is in fact
reversed under high levels of risk aversion, thereby
demonstrating the adverse impact of risk aversion
on Government policymaking.
5. Conclusion
Although the implications of uncertainty and risk
aversion for optimal investment have been explored
in the real options literature within a wide range of
Figure 2. Option and project value for r ¼ 0:07, 0:2 (left panel) and for z ¼ 0:4, 0:5 (right panel) for S¼ 0.05. Greater eco-
nomic uncertainty raises the value of waiting, and, in turn, the required investment threshold and optimal capacity, while
greater z lowers the expected utility of the revenues and increases the incentive to postpone investment.
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contexts, policy-oriented applications with the con-
text of PPPs remain somewhat limited. Therefore,
we develop a utility-based, bi-level real options
framework, where decisions over capacity invest-
ment and subsidy design are determined endogen-
ously taking into account the interaction between
Figure 3. Optimal investment threshold (left panels) and optimal capacity (right panels) versus c for r ¼ 0:15, 0:2, 0:3:
Greater risk aversion accelerates (postpones) investment and lowers (lowers) the amount of installed capacity when the sub-
sidy is defined exogenously (endogenously).
Figure 4. Probability of investment (left panel) and optimal subsidy level (right panel) versus c and r. Greater risk aversion
and economic uncertainty lower the probability of investment but the impact of economic uncertainty on the optimal subsidy
is ambiguous.
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firm- and Government-level policymaking. Results
indicate that the impact of risk aversion on capacity
investment decisions is different than what existing
literature indicates. Indeed, we find that greater risk
aversion lowers the optimal capacity of a project but
raises the required investment threshold. This is
contrary to Chronopoulos et al. (2013), who find
that greater risk aversion lowers both the optimal
capacity and the required investment threshold. In
addition, we confirm that greater economic uncer-
tainty raises the optimal subsidy under risk neutral-
ity, as shown in Lukas and Thiergart (2019), but we
also find that the impact of economic uncertainty is
reversed under high levels of risk aversion.
These results emphasise the implications of risk
aversion for policymaking at a firm and a
Government level when support takes the form of a
cash grant. Within this context, greater risk aversion
reduces not only the investment intensity but also
the likelihood of investment. Despite the benefits
that PPPs may present over public subsidies in
terms of promoting RE investment (Buso & Stenger,
2018), it seems that PPP agreements must be
designed carefully to take into account how risk
aversion may hinder Government planning that
aims to achieve specific targets, in terms of both
investment timing and intensity. In addition, results
suggest that optimal subsidy design at a
Government level must consider the interaction
between risk aversion and economic uncertainty,
since the nature of this interaction under risk neu-
trality cannot be transposed naturally within a risk
averse context.
A limitation of our model is that it ignores stra-
tegic interactions, as it considers a single firm, and,
therefore, a natural extension of the existing frame-
work would be to allow for oligopolistic competi-
tion. Hence, a directions for further research may
include the implementation of strategic interactions,
whereby two firms compete in the procurement of a
PPP agreement. Following the same approach as
Takashima et al. (2008), it would be interesting to
explore how asymmetric competition and manager-
ial flexibility may impact the strategic advantage of
a firm and the outcome of competition in the pro-
curement of a PPP agreement. In the same direc-
tion, another extension may include not only the
analysis of duopolistic competition, but also the
implications for social welfare, as in Huisman and
Kort (2015). Also, to explore the application poten-
tial of our and other similar utility-based frame-
works, a direction for further research could involve
the development of an empirical framework for esti-
mating the level of risk aversion within the context
of RE investment (Kim & Lee, 2012; Eisenhauer &
Ventura, 2003). In turn, this will support the devel-
opment of a realistic case study.
Furthermore, the implications of utilising a dif-
ferent discount rate at a firm and a Government
level, as in Pennings (2000), could provide further
insights to the line of work that tackles the problem
of optimal combination of investment subsidy and
tax cut under risk aversion. In addition, by assum-
ing an inverse demand function, as in Sendstad and
Chronopoulos (2021), we may relax the assumption
of a price-taking firm, which deprives our analysis
of insights related to the feedback effect of capacity
expansion on the price process. Finally, our frame-
work may be extended to allow for different invest-
ment cost functions (Dangl, 1999), operational
flexibility in the form of suspension and resumption
options (Chronopoulos et al., 2011) and capacity
switching options (Siddiqui & Takashima, 2012).
Notes
1. Although the GBM facilitates mathematical
tractability, a limitation of the GBM for modelling
energy prices is that it is not valid for short-term
operational analysis, as it cannot capture strong mean
reversion and spikes (Deng, 2005).
2. It is possible to apply a wide range of investment cost
functions within the same framework, e.g., IðQÞ ¼
aQb where a and b are positive constants, in order to
analyse the implications of economies of scale,
however, the specific choice is motivated by Lukas
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We can derive the optimal
investment threshold and the optimal capacity by decom-
posing the investment decision in two stages. First, the
firm exercises a now-or-never investment opportunity,
which implies that the output price at investment is
known and the firm needs to determine only the optimal
capacity. The optimisation objective when a firm exercises
a now-or-never investment decision is described in (A-1).
max
Q
AU ð1 zÞXQð Þ  1
q
U rðI  SÞð Þ
 
(A-1)
By applying the first-order necessary condition (FONC)




AU ð1 zÞXQð Þ  1
q
U rðI  SÞð Þ
 
¼ 0





  c1 r
ð1QÞ2 ¼ 0
(A-2)
Next, we assume that the firm has the option to delay
investment and that the required investment threshold
exceeds the current output price. The optimisation object-






AU ð1 zÞXsQð Þ  1qU rðI  SÞð Þ
 
(A-3)
By applying the FONC to the unconstrained optimisa-
tion problem (A-3) we obtain








and solving with respect to Xs we have:










Inserting the expression for Xs from (A-5) into (A-2) we
obtain (A-6).
b1ð1þ SÞQ2 2b1Sþ cð ÞQþ b1S ¼ 0 (A-6)
The analytical expression for the optimal capacity is
obtain by solving (A-6) and is described in (A-7), where
D ¼ c24b1Sðb1cÞ






and, thus, the expression for I(Q) is:







Proof of Proposition 2 The second-order sufficiency
condition requires that the objective function is concave
at the critical threshold Xs: Hence, we first need to calcu-
late the second derivative of FfðÞ and evaluate it at Xs:
@2FfðXÞ
@X2s








2b1A ð1 zÞXsQ½ c þAðc1Þ ð1 zÞXsQ½ c
(A-9)




b1ðb1 þ 1Þ  2b1cþ cðc 1Þð Þb11<0 (A-10)
After simplifying the above expression we have
@Ff ðXÞ
@Xs
<0 () cðcb1Þ<0, which holds for all c<1, i.e.,
the range of c corresponding to risk aversion. w
Proof of Proposition 3 The partial derivative @Q@c >0 is
described in (A-11). Note that greater risk aversion is
reflected in lower values of c. Hence, @Q@c >0 implies that
Q increases with lower risk aversion, i.e., as c increases,
or, equivalently, that Q decreases with greater risk aver-

















Note also that the optimal investment threshold Xs is a
monotonic function of the optimal capacity, and, there-
fore, a greater c should also raise the optimal investment
threshold. Intuitively, a greater output price is required to




















































It suffices to show that the numerator in (A-13) is posi-
tive. Since @b1@r <0, we must show that the term within the
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Notice that all the terms in (A-15) are negative, and,
thus, the last inequality holds. w
Proof of Proposition 5 The Government’s optimisa-








r  l  S
 
(A-16)









r  l  S
 
(A-17)
where QðIðSÞÞ ¼ IðSÞ1þIðSÞ : The objective is to solve the equa-
tion dFgðSÞdS ¼ 0: Note that
dFgðSÞ





































Since (A-18) is highly non-linear, it is not possible to
obtain an analytical solution for the optimal subsidy, and,
therefore, we solve for S numerically. w
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